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The Argentine Great Depression
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to comprehend the business cycle of the Argentine Crisis (1998-2002). The
following paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic,
analyzing its causes and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the
Argentine government to combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the IS-LM
model of macroeconomics.
This article is available in Undergraduate Economic Review: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/24
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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to comprehend the business cycle of the Argentine Crisis (1998-2002). The following 
paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic, analyzing its causes 
and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the Argentine government to 
combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the IS-LM model of macroeconomics.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
By the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th, Argentina was an economic powerhouse. Rich in natural 
resources, economically successful, with GDP that rivaled European counterparts such as Germany and France, it 
was an inspiring development story in progress. Nowadays, the story is much different. Argentina’s GDP per 
capita (PPP) is of $20.2001, different from the German $48.200 or the $42.400 made by the French. What caused a 
promising young nation to go astray and even fall behind some of its Latin-American neighbors? The causes are 
multiple. They arise from government instability (Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini 1996), leading to poor fiscal and 
monetary policy. Until this day, Argentina has lived through multiple recessions and periods of hyperinflation, all 
of which have turned this 19th century powerhouse into an economic miscarriage. This paper explores one of those 
appalling events: the 1998-2002 crisis that swept Argentina into one of the most disastrous recessions of its history.  
During the 80s, hyperinflation was soaring in Argentina, reaching levels of 3079% in 19892. In response, a 
currency board was enacted—fixing the exchange rate to try to control inflation—fixing the peso to the US dollar. 
The policy seemed to work, and there was a tad of optimism looking into the 21st century. Nonetheless, 
international economic conditions proved Argentina wrong. Brazil devalued its currency, making Argentinian 
goods uncompetitive in the international market. High fiscal budgets raised the interest rate to discouraging levels 
for investors. Argentina was starting to bury itself into a recession. Considering the economic situation and the 
artificially appreciated Argentinean Peso, the IMF decided not to support Argentina, terminating any hopes of a 
bail-out. A devaluation of the Peso seemed logical, leading to a major-bank run3 as Argentinians tried to get the 
most US dollars out of their Pesos. And so, Argentina found itself in a recession that, at least in the local level, 
many consider as severe as the Great Depression. It had catastrophic results: almost 20 years of economic growth 
																																								 																				
1The	World	Factbook.	Report.	Central	Intelligence	Agency.	2016.	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.	
2Corden,	W.	Max.	"Exchange	Rate	Policies	for	Developing	Countries."	The	Economic	Journal	103,	no.	416	(1993):	198.	
doi:10.2307/2234346.	
3	"Countdown	to	disaster."	The	Economist.	March	30,	2002.	Accessed	May	10,	2017.	
3
Aggarwal et al.: The Argentine Great Depression
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
	 	 	
where lost4, the amount of people living under the poverty line was of 52% in 2002, and after a default, Argentina 
lost much needed credibility in the international markets.  
The following paper will outline the crisis, starting off with a comprehensive literature review on the topic, 
analyzing its causes and consequences, followed by a survey on the policy-responses undertaken by the Argentine 
government to combat the recession. The crisis will then be analyzed in the context of the IS-LM model. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Due to its unprecedented scale, the Argentine crisis from 1998-2002 has been the subject of a vast body of 
economic literature. However, there is a clear divide on what subparts of the crisis economists decided to research. 
The dissociation could be summarized as follow: 
The effects of the crisis: While an important subfield of economics is devoted to understanding the causes 
of a recession, as a vague of emerging countries defaulted at the beginning of the 21st century, scholars started to 
investigate the social and economic cost of a crisis. For example, Bozzoli and Quintana (2014)5 showed that the 
birth weight of children from less educated background was heavily correlated with macroeconomic fluctuations. 
As interestingly, Cavagnero and Bilger (2009), demonstrated that the Argentine public healthcare system 
disproportionately decreased in efficiency depending on the income-group of the patient, thus leading to a higher 
level of inequality6. 
The end of currency-exchange: Bajaras et al. (2007), in a working paper for the IMF showed that the 
banking system was not uniformly affected by the end of the U.S. Dollar party. Depositors were able to determine 
																																								 																				
4The	Argentine	Crisis	2001/2002.	Report.	RaboResearch	-	Economic	Research,	Rabobank.	
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-crisis-20012002-/.	
5	Bozzoli,	Carlos	and	Climent	Quintana-Domeque.	"The	Weight	of	the	Crisis:	Evidence	from	Newborns	in	Argentina."	Review	
of	Economics	and	Statistics,	vol.	96,	no.	3,	July	2014,	pp.	550-562.	EBSCOhost,	doi:www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest.	
6	Cavagnero,	Eleonora	and	Marcel	Bilger.	"Equity	during	an	Economic	Crisis:	Financing	of	the	Argentine	Health	System."	
Journal	of	Health	Economics,	vol.	29,	no.	4,	July	2010,	pp.	479-488.	EBSCOhost,	
doi:www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296	
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the institutions that were the most likely to be at risk. As a result, despite facing the same macroeconomic scenario, 
comparable banks were affected by varying degrees. Another study from Betty (2010) was able to apply a model 
linking fiscal solvency with currency exchange rate to explain the sudden fall of the pesos during the crisis7. 
The restructuring of the debt: A common belief in international market is that crisis in one country 
increases the likelihood of crisis in a different country. However, Melisso (2005) demonstrated by studying the 
argentine crisis in the context of other crisis among developing countries that the concept of contagion was simply 
nonexistent. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2011) were able to successfully predict that the likelihood of a debt default 
among Latin America by looking at closing Credit Default Swaps rates thus allowing both investors and policy-
makers to forecast financial markets’ behaviors8.  
3 CAUSES OF THE RECESSION 
 Argentina has had a history of turbulent economic, political and monetary problems. The country 
experienced rapid economic growth during the periods of early 1900s, mainly due to an enormous increase in 
exports of goods to the European market. However, due to frequent structural changes in the type of government, 
the country has for long suffered from unstable political and economic situation. Prior to 1999, the Peso was 
pegged to the USD in response to the ongoing hyperinflation. The successful growth of the real GDP to 10.3% in 
1992 led to an overly optimistic view of the country’s future growth potential.  9However, with major economic 
changes in other countries, the repercussions on the Argentine economy did not end too well.  The policy decision 
regarding fixed exchange rate caused a major problem later, that triggered the economic crisis of 1999-2002. 10 As 
																																								 																				
7	Daniel,	Betty	C.	"Exchange	Rate	Crises	and	Fiscal	Solvency."	Journal	of	Money,	Credit,	and	Banking,	vol.	42,	no.	6,	Sept.	
2010,	pp.	1109-1135.	EBSCOhost,	doi:onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291538-4616/issues.	
8	Chen,	Yi-Hsuan,	et	al.	"Default	Correlation	at	the	Sovereign	Level:	Evidence	from	some	Latin	American	Markets."	Applied	
Economics,	vol.	43,	no.	10-12,	April-May	2011,	pp.	1399-1411.	EBSCOhost,	doi:www.tandfonline.com/loi/raec20.	
9	Geithner	,	Timothy.	Lessons	from	the	Crisis	in	Argentina	.	Publication.	Policy	Development	and	Review	Department	,	
International	Monetary	Fund.	Oct.	&	nov.,	2003.	https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf.	
10	Saxton,	Jim.	“ARGENTINA’S	ECONOMIC	CRISIS:	CAUSES	AND	CURES”.	Publication.	Joint	Economic	Committee,	United	
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the economy of the United States became stronger and stronger, USD began appreciating relative to Peso. This led 
to a fall in the Argentine exports as these goods became more expensive than before.  The repercussions of the East 
Asian currency crisis furthered the likelihood of a recession in the country. Brazil, which was Argentina’s largest 
trading competitor, devalued the Real from 1.21 per dollar to 2.18 per dollar. Due to the depreciation of the 
Brazilian currency, Argentine products were substituted, and investors and buyers found their dollars could buy 
more in Brazil than in Argentina. Figure 1.1 illustrates the impact of changes in the Net Exports on the Aggregate 
Demand and Aggregate Supply graph.   
 
Figure 1.1 
Due to a reduction in exports, the Aggregate Demand curve shifts left, thereby reducing overall price level 
and real GDP of the economy. This signaled the contraction of the economy.  
Additionally, policy decisions taken by the government of Carlon Menem focused on extensive borrowing 
for the sake of increasing spending, something that costed the country a lot in the long run. Table 1 illustrates the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 												
States	Congress.	Accessed	June	2003.	http://www.stockssite.com/en/argentina.pdf.	
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annual government expenditure (as a % of GDP) by the Argentine government from years 1993-2001.11  
Table 1: Annual Government Expenditure (as % of GDP) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
19.0 19.9 19.6 20.1 20.1 20.3 21.9 22.1 23.2 
 
Due to extensive borrowings by the government during the periods of 1995-2001, the total government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from 19.6 % in 1995 to 23.2% in 2001. Eventually, the government 
acquired a lot of debt which soared domestic interest rates. In the 1990s, the government of Menem enforced a 
system of free enterprise that stimulated a wave of privatization. However, his led to additional problems with 
regards to unemployment. Around 1998, real wages lost roughly 36% of their purchasing power and 
unemployment climbed to its highest point since the Great Depression. 12The main problem came when all these 
changes began having micro level impact. Due to privatization of many sectors, costs of basic services such as the 
electricity and phones spiraled upwards causing inflation in the economy. Argentina was clearly in a recession by 
this time. The debt burden along with the shrinking tax revenues, signaled economic slowdown in the country, and 
made IMF decide to not bail the country out.  
4 POLICY RESPONSE 
4.1 DEBT 
 After three years of continuous recession and month-long riots throughout the country, on the 26th 
December 2001 the Argentine government publicly announced that it was unable to pay back a total of $85 billion 
to its creditors, that is the largest sovereign debt default in history. As a result, the quasi totality of foreign 
																																								 																				
11	Geithner	,	Timothy.	Lessons	from	the	Crisis	in	Argentina	.	Publication.	Policy	Development	and	Review	Department	,	
International	Monetary	Fund.	Oct.	&	nov.,	2003.	https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf.	
12	Agencies,	Staff	And.	"Timeline:	Argentina's	economic	crisis."	The	Guardian.	December	20,	2001.	Accessed	May	10,	2017.	
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/20/argentina1.	
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investment inflow ceased, financial markets devalued the pesos to a fourth of its pre-default value, and inflation 
rose by an estimated 40%. It is believed that the starting point of what would soon become an unprecedented 
economic turmoil is the inability of the government to meet its financial obligations. In order to understand why 
such a difficult political decision was made, one has to understand the reasons that lead the government to decide 
to not repay its debt. 
 For  Miguel Kegel, a former undersecretary of finance of Argentina, two main elements can provide an 
explanation13. First, to restore its competitiveness and solvency, the government attempted to self-induce domestic 
deflation while decreasing its budget deficit. This policy was intended to put downward pressure on prices while 
allowing the government to partially repay its debt to international creditors. However, the impossibility to devalue 
its currency due to a 1-to-1 peg with the American dollars embedded in the law and a strong resistance from the 
middle-class to decrease real wages led to a failure of this policy. Second, a significant share of short-term 
liabilities throughout the argentine banking system was expressed in U.S. dollars whereas most liquidity held by 
banks were labelled in pesos. This undoubtedly put the economy at risk of a run-on banks. Without an international 
lender of last resorts to cover for the lack of American liquidity, it was virtually impossible for banks to cover the 
totality of their deposits in dollars. Facing an important pressure from the street as well as an ever accumulation of 
debt coming from abroad, the government decided to default on its external debt and lifted the American dollar 
parity. 
 The expected chaos that would follow did happen. Due to a complete freeze in transaction expressed in 
dollars without authorization from the central bank, hospitals to local shops soon became unable to access a vast 
array of foreign goods ranging from medicines to Chilean salmon14. The entire chain of payment between 
customers, business, and suppliers broke down further worsening the economic crisis. Nonetheless, as soon as the 
																																								 																				
13	https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_argentina_kiguel.pdf	
14	"A	decline	without	parallel."	The	Economist.	March	02,	2002.	Accessed	May	11,	2017.	
http://www.economist.com/node/1010911.	
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default of the debt was pronounced a large-scale plan of debt-restructuring was put in place. A large portion of the 
external debt was owned by private citizens in Europe who had invested their savings in debts funds. However, 
while 93% of the bondholders accepted a reduced payment of their investment, nearly 7% of the creditors, as 
defined by the quantity of debt owned, decided to sue the argentine government for a full repayment. Among them 
were mostly hedge-funds and vulture funds15. Many of these court cases are still even unsettled today. During the 
crisis and its aftermath, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was heavily criticized for its lack of support to the 
government. Despite several attempts from Argentina, the IMF refused to offer the liquidities the country 
desperately needed. Even after the crisis passed, the IMF made sure that its initial loan was fully repaid despite 
some precedents of laissez-faire during similar cases. 
 Thanks to a prolonged period of sustainable economic growth Argentina decided in 2005 to refinance for a 
second time its debt. During this process, most of the bonds were linked to GDP growth which would allow the 
government to meet its payment only if the economy brought enough budget surplus to do so. Along this process 
numerous investors including countries such as Venezuela and private banks decided to buy back a total of $62.5 
billion of debt therefore ending the sovereign debt crisis. 
4.2 EXCHANGE RATE 
 The Argentinian Peso had been pegged to the dollar on a one to one basis. By 2001, it had been so for 
almost a decade. The policy was rooted in what seemed sound monetary policy. In 1990, inflation was soaring at a 
rate of 2,314% a year. By 1994, it had been stabilized to 4% a year16. But in the late 90s, the policy proved 
disastrous. As the US dollar rightfully strengthened, so did the Peso. The East Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian 
crisis of 1998 made foreign investors especially wary of developing countries. Foreign investment decreased, and 
																																								 																				
15	"Argentine	Funds	Can't	Be	Seized	by	Bond	Holders,	Judge	Says".	Bloomberg.	March	28,	2012.	Retrieved	August	29,	2013.	
16	Weisbrot, Mark, and Luis Sandoval. Argentina’s Economic Recovery Policy Choices and Implications . Report. 
Center for Economic and Policy Research. October 2007. 
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina_recovery_2007_10.pdf	Bozzoli,	Carlos	and	Climent	Quintana-
Domeque.	"The	Weight	of	the	Crisi	
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with the Argentinian Peso pegged to a high dollar, it became too expensive to conduct business in Argentina, or 
buy Argentinian goods. Brazil, with a floating exchange rate, was far more competitive. This was one of the drivers 
of the recession, and the situation was unsustainable. With a devaluation on sight, the government enacted a 
“corralito” to avoid a major bank-run from Argentinians trying to get the most out of their dollars, that is all bank 
transactions were frozen and limited to a weekly amount.  
 As the country prepared for a devaluation, the government fixed and official exchange rate before letting it 
float. All bank accounts held in Dollars would be exchanged to Pesos on a 1.4 Pesos/USD rate. There was an 
international outcry, leading to sues against the government.17 The extent of this policy can be better understood 
when one looks at the nominal exchange rate in 2002. One dollar was now worth 3.6 pesos. The exchange rate 
proved propitious for exports; soon after the devaluation, there was a spike in Argentine exports. The devaluation 
generated serious inflationary pressures on the economy—matter that will be further developed in the next 
section—and the Argentinian government constantly intervened in the markets to balance the exchange rate. First, 
it tried to combat inflation by dampening the Peso devaluation. But soon after, as exports increased and the Peso 
appreciated, it started intervening in the opposite direction. The goal was to stabilize the exchange rate and 
promote consumption and investment. The policy worked. Consumption and investment were the main drivers of 
the recovery.   
4.3 INFLATION 
 Major volatility in the exchange rate of Peso during the Argentine crisis had enormous impacts on the 
inflation in the economy. The devaluation of the currency had caused a significant spike in the inflation rate to 
more than 28% annually. Argentina reached a point where it was on the verge of hyperinflation in an attempt to 
control fiscal and monetary policies. As explained before, the government realized the importance of the stability 
																																								 																				
17"Argentina loses $1.3bn debt court appeal." BBC News. August 25, 2013. Accessed May 10, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-23832247.	
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of nominal exchange rates in order to stabilize inflation and the financial system overall. By 2005, the country had 
successfully been able to recover. However, the prolonged economic expansion strained the industrial capacity that 
essentially led to a dramatic drop in the employment rate. According to the 2005 Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
reports, during the third quarter of 2005, the CPI for Argentine goods spiked to 2.6% quarter of quarter. This 
suggested inflationary pressures on the economy. 18 As a result, the Argentine government, yet again, chose to 
enforce diametrically opposite policy implications that led to re-centralization of government control over the 
market. It directly controlled prices and set stringent regulations on the export of goods in order to sustain prices at 
low levels. In the short-run, this decision proved to be fruitful in tackling the problem of exorbitant inflation rates, 
however the long-run results seem uncertain, given the frequent change in the government of the country.  
5 CONSEQUENCES 
 After four rough years of economic instability, Argentina finally started getting matters under control. Just 
three months after having a $100 billion debt default, the Argentine economy began growing rapidly. With more 
than 50% GDP growth, the country became the fastest growing economy in the West. One of the major decisions 
taken by the government in order to end the crisis was to overturn the policy regarding the Peso beings fixed at a 
one-to-one exchange rate with the dollar. 19The exchange rate fixation had caused unbearable burden for the 
economy over the years, and so with the help of large scale protests in January 2002, the convertibility system was 
formally abolished. However, three months out of the recession, the Argentine economy was still in financial 
disarray. It was only due to the massive devaluation of the Pesos against the dollar in 2002, that opportunities for 
exports re-appeared and the economy finally expanded. The new range of 1.4 to 3.7 pesos per dollar also boosted 
import based industries in the country. Eventual increase in private consumption and investment that followed up 
																																								 																				
18	Solutions,	EIU	Digital.	"EIU	Store."	Argentina	Country	Risk.	Accessed	May	10,	2017.	
http://store.eiu.com/product.aspx?pubid=820001082.	
19	Weisbrot,	Mark,	and	Luis	Sandoval.	Argentina’s	Economic	Recovery	Policy	Choices	and	Implications.	Publication.	CEPR,	
Center	for	Economic	and	Policy	Research.	Oct.	&	nov.	2007.	
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/argentina_recovery_2007_10.pdf.	
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from the export boost, caused the rest of the recovery of the economy. Figure 1.2 illustrates the recovery process of 
the Argentine economy.   
 
Figure 2.2 
By 2005, the Argentine government was successful in restoring both foreign as well as domestic 
investment credibility. Due to a considerable pressure from the IMF to provide better financial terms post the debt 
default crisis, the government was finally able to arrange a debt swap that took $67.3 billion debt off the records. 
Additionally, the Argentine government’s willingness to accept an annual inflation rate of more than 28% post the 
devaluation of Pesos helped stabilize the nominal exchange rate and led to an extensive growth rate. By 2005 the 
Argentine economy had fully recovered and was growing extensively. Total spending increased dramatically (by 
4.6% points of GDP) with the current account being in surplus. Thus, Argentina’s recovery from one of its worst 
recessions was truly rapid. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The Argentine crisis of 1998-2002 is known as the Argentine Great Depression. Such a reference, to 
one of the most devastating economic crisis of modern time, seems appropriate. GDP contracted by 28%, the 
per capita measurement regressed 20 years. Unemployment reached a peak level of 20%. The number of people 
living under the poverty line—as defined by the Argentine government—was 52%; 25 out of every 100 
Argentinians were considered indigent20. The crisis had unprecedented repercussions for what seemed a 
promising Argentine economy.  
The crisis is an example of seemingly good policy gone wrong. Having a currency board seemed a 
reasonable measure to combat hyperinflation. In fact, it worked, allowing Argentina to have high levels of 
growth during the 90s, and generate enough confidence in their bonds to emit high levels of debt. But 
eventually, a Peso pegged to the dollar casted a gloomy shadow over Argentina. The crisis also exemplifies the 
dangers of sustaining a large government deficit over a prolonged period. A large deficit coupled with 
uncompetitive exports led Argentina into one devastating recession.   
The present investigation has analyzed the Argentinean Great Recession in the context of the aggregate 
supply and aggregate demand models. As explained, the fall in exports and the burdensome government deficit 
shifted the aggregate demand curve to the left, decreasing output and generating a recession. The government 
response, letting the peso float and reducing the deficit, allowed for a recovery in both the export economy and 
in consumption and investment, both of which increased aggregate demand and shifted the AD curve back to its 
pre-crisis level. After such a far-reaching recession, it comes into question whether Argentina has learned from 
its mistakes. Is Argentina’s potential still there to achieve? And if so, will Argentina ever achieve it?21 
																																								 																				
20	Cruces, Guillermo, and Quentin Wodon. "Argentina’s Crises and the Poor, 1995-2002 ." Distributional Analysis 
Research Programme , July 2003. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/93952.pdf.	
21	For	further	reading	on	Argentina’s	current	state	see:	"Down	Argentina	Way."	The	New	York	Times.	May	03,	2012.	
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